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ABSTRACT Existing studies imply a model of “thermostatic voting”—a phenomenon char-
acterized by negative feedback from government policy to election outcomes, suggesting
that a party’s success in setting policy diminishes its electoral prospects. This phenom-
enon could give politicians an incentive to constrain the fulﬁllment of public demands,
which would conﬂict with the notion of electoral accountability, which also forms part of
the theoretical framework in question. This article addresses this paradox and provides
new data that expand an existing time series of American policy liberalism. Employing the
new data, the article identiﬁes thermostatic voting in American presidential elections, but
in light of the analysis, certain empirical features are also identiﬁed that reduce the possi-
ble incentive to withhold promised policy changes.
Doelection outcomes reﬂect the extent towhich cur-rent government policy is liberal or conservative?A set of existing studies implies so.Wlezien (1995,1996) argues public opinion works as a thermo-stat in the sense that policy preferences respond
negatively to policy change. Thus, liberal policies, for example,
result in a less liberal public (see also Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002). Related studies further argue public opinion inﬂu-
ences election outcomes, as less liberal preferences translate into
fewer liberal votes (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stim-
son 1999b). Although these studies imply that current govern-
ment policy shapes election outcomes through public opinion,
this implication has not been subjected to direct empirical inquiry,
nor has it received thorough theoretical discussion.
The implication that votes reﬂect currentpolicy is referred to in
this article as “thermostatic voting:” More liberal policy satisﬁes
the demands of a liberal few, and with less demand for additional
liberal policies, liberal candidates receive fewer votes. The follow-
ing paradox presents itself: Political actors electedwith the help of
a particular public mood, and who in turn respond to the public’s
demands as promised, may diminish their own electoral pros-
pects. Thus, politicians may have an incentive to withhold prom-
isedchanges toavoid satisfying thedemands thatgot themelected
into oﬃce. This incentive would conﬂict with the model of elec-
toral accountability, which assumes it is rational for politicians to
respond to public demands in an accurate way to avoid electoral
defeat.The tensionbetween these twomodels poses a challenge to
the theoretical framework, as this framework contains them both
(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and
Erikson 1995; see also Soroka andWlezien 2004, 2005, 2010; Stim-
son 1999a, 2004;Wlezien 2004).
Although the existing literature rests on a sound empirical foun-
dation, the analyses rely on a limited number of observationswith
respect to presidential elections. This article therefore provides
new data that expand an existing time series of American policy
liberalism so that it covers the period from 1947 to 2008, which
encompasses ﬁfteen presidencies. The new data test the hypoth-
esis of thermostatic voting, and the hypothesis does receive sup-
port. Given the tension between themodels of thermostatic voting
and electoral accountability, the article concludes with a discus-
sion of how certain features of the empirical results may allow for
the presence of both.
BACKGROUND
Whereas voters long appeared disappointingly uninformed about
politics, and their policy preferences seemed randomand incoher-
ent,1 Stimson’s Public Opinion in America demonstrates that the
preferences of American citizens conform to a coherent overall
pattern, referred to as their public policy mood (Stimson 1991,
1999b; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1994). Stimson further
argues the single dimension of liberalism versus conservatism suf-
ﬁces to capture the mood of the American public.2 Because the
items that make up this dimension tend to be issues of more or
less government, Stimson’smeasure ofmood captures policy pref-
erences that are relative to current policy.
Classic system theories of democracy suggest that such rela-
tive policy preferences respond to policy outputs and generate
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feedback in the political system (Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953, 1965).
This view is supported by Wlezien (1995, 1996), who argues the
public works like a thermostat: The public adjusts its calls for
more or less spending in a policy area according to what it gets. In
general terms, “the public’s preference for more [or less] policy—
its relative preference [. . .]—represents the diﬀerence between the
public’s preferred level of policy [. . .] and policy [. . .] itself” (Wle-
zien 1995, 985–986, see also Erikson,MacKuen, and Stimson 2002;
Franklin andWlezien 1997; Soroka andWlezien 2010). Whereas
Wlezien applies this model to spending in speciﬁc policy areas,
thismodel has also been applied to the liberal-conservative dimen-
sion (Erikson,MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 325–382).The public’s
preferred level of policy along this dimension is referred to in this
article as its Preference, and its relative preference asMood. Thus,
Wlezien’s model can be expressed as:
Moodt  PreferencetPolicytl , (1)
where the subscript t refers to time and l is the appropriate lag of
policy (depending on how quickly the public takes notice of new
policies). Thismodel implies thatmoodwill be positively aﬀected
by an increase in the public’s preference and negatively aﬀected
by an increase in policy.3
Looking at the eﬀect of mood on policy, Stimson, MacKuen,
and Erikson (1995) argue “dynamic representation” takes place in
theUnited States (see also Erikson,MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).
In other words, policy changes when mood changes, so that the
former tracks the latter over time. For example, a more liberal
public mood results in more liberal policies. Twomechanisms are
said to account for this relationship. One is that of “rational
anticipation”—thenotion that politicians adapt to changes inmood
to avoid electoral defeat.The other is the “turnover”mechanism—
the notion that mood inﬂuences election outcomes, putting new
politicians in power and, thus, indirectly aﬀecting policy. More
speciﬁcally, a liberal mood is expected to translate into a larger
liberal (i.e., Democratic) vote share, and ultimately tomore liberal
policies. Accordingly, a few studies attempt to explain presiden-
tial elections by the current mood (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stim-
son 2002, 237–283; Stimson 1999b, 97–120).4
Although both the eﬀect of policy on mood and the eﬀect of
mood on presidential elections have received empirical support,
neither is as ﬁrmly established as one might expect. Looking at
the impact of mood on presidential elections, Stimson (1999b)
analyses 11 observations of the national vote. Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson (2002, 243) regret that “between 1952 and 1996,” they
“have a scant 12 observations of presidential elections for statis-
tical analysis,” and state “any statistical results must remain ten-
tative and open to rival interpretation.”This article adds to policy
data presented in current literature and focuses on the hypothesis
of thermostatic voting, which is presented in the following text.
This approach allows more elections to be included in the analy-
sis, and a positive resultwill increase conﬁdence in earlier ﬁndings.
THERMOSTATICVOTING AND ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Taken together, the earlier studies imply that election outcomes,
in terms of support for one party rather than the other, react to
policy. If elections are inﬂuenced by mood and mood is inﬂu-
enced by policy, then elections must be inﬂuenced by policy. The
eﬀect of policy on elections is referred to here as thermostatic
voting. If the liberal end of the liberal-conservative dimension is
given higher values on each variable, thermostatic voting can be
modeled by this equation:
Democratic Votet  ab *Moodt «t
ab~PreferencetPolicytl ! «t , (2)
where a is a constant, b is a coeﬃcient, « is an error term captur-
ing all other inﬂuences, and equation 1 is used to replace mood in
the last part. In terms of change we have:
DDemocratic Votet  bD~PreferencetPolicytl ! «t + (3)
The negative feedback of policy in this model is rather paradoxi-
cal. For example, it suggests a Democratic incumbent will lose
votes by enacting liberal policies, as the public’s mood will grow
more conservative.5 In other words, political actors elected with
the help of a public mood, and who subsequently respond to the
public’s demands as promised, may diminish their own electoral
prospects. This electoral reaction could give politicians an incen-
tive to constrain the fulﬁllment of public demands to avoid satis-
fying the mood that helped elect them into oﬃce.
Thus, the model of thermostatic voting stands in notable con-
trast to that of electoral accountability, which instead requires
voters to punish poor representation of voter preferences (e.g.,
Maravall and Sánchez-Cuenca 2007; Przeworski, Stokes, and
Manin 1999). According to the latter model, a Democratic incum-
bent should not be losing votes by satisfying a liberal policymood,
but rather by failing to do so. This idea is also reﬂected in the
theory of dynamic representation, as the mechanism of rational
anticipation assumes it is rational for politicians to please the
electorate in terms of policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002; Stimson,MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). The idea of electoral
accountability suggests the incumbent will gain votes if the gap
between policy and the public’s preference is decreased, and lose
votes if the gap grows. In other words, the incumbent will be
rewarded for reducing the absolute value of mood, and punished
for increasing it, as expressed by this model:
DIncumbent Votet bD6Moodt 6 «t
bD6PreferencetPolicytl 6 «t + (4)
In the case of a Democratic incumbent, for whom the model is
more easily compared to the preceding models, we have:
DDemocratic Votet bD6PreferencetPolicytl 6 «t + (5)
In other words, for a Democratic incumbent, the models of ther-
mostatic voting (equation 3) and electoral accountability (equa-
tion 5) overlap when policy is more liberal than the public’s
preference, so that mood is conservative. A Democratic incum-
bent enacting liberal policies will then lose votes according to
bothmodels.Themodels conﬂict, however, when the public’s pref-
erence is more liberal than current policy so that mood is liberal,
which is a likely situation for a newly elected Democrat. In this
situation, electoral accountability suggests that satisfying the lib-
eral mood by enacting liberal policies will be rewarded, whereas
thermostatic voting suggests the opposite. To test the hypothesis
of thermostatic voting and to facilitate further research on these
topics, this article provides new policy data through a brief review
of recent American political history.
MEASURING CURRENT POLICY
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 328–336, 374–380) con-
struct a measure of policy that works well in relation to mood,
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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and it is used here as well. They code the ideological content of
enactments seen as important at the time, as listed by Mayhew
(1991).Their data cover the period from 1953 to 1996, whichwould
only allow the analysis of 10presidential elections (given the appro-
priate lag).6 However, this is an unnecessarily short series. May-
hew’s ﬁrst investigation startswith 1947, andhe continues tomake
available lists ofmore recent enactments (themore recent sources
of relevance are:Mayhew 2005, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).To strengthen
the analysis, this article provides new policy data for the years
from 1947 to 1952 and from 1997 to 2008. This means that 5 addi-
tional elections can be included in the analysis.
The data have been produced in accordance with Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson’s procedures which means that enact-
ments relating to agriculture or foreign or defense policy, and
those with a predominantly local impact, have been excluded.
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s strategy of coding the content
based on their own judgment of “whether the law was seen by
contemporary observers as moving policy in a conservative or a
liberal direction” has also been pursued here (Erikson, Mac-
Kuen, and Stimson 2002, 330). Such coding inevitably relies on
subjective judgment, and it involves many tough decisions, some
of which are discussed in the text that follows. Several enact-
ments have been omitted because they were trade-oﬀs or had an
ambiguous content. Scholars who disagree with particular cod-
ing decisions, but who would like to use these data, are invited
to revise the coding.
A few additional coding decisions are worth mentioning.
Enactments with a “triggering cause more or less external to
American national politics” (Mayhew 2005, 136) have not been
excluded automatically. Such enactments have often been per-
ceived as involving important policy changes, and they reﬂect
the political environment of their time. Enactments with sunset
clauses have neither necessarily been excluded, as their enact-
ment often has been seen as (at least signaling) important policy
changes, in contrast to their termination.
Table 1 reports the enactments coded from 1947 to 1952. Enact-
ments judged by Mayhew to have been exceptionally important
at the time are in bold. The most diﬃcult cases in this period are
the three temporary tax increases made to ﬁnance the Korean
War. Because the war could have been ﬁnanced in other ways,
and in accordance with the procedures laid out earlier, these bills
have all been counted as liberal.
From 1991 to 1996, Erikson,MacKuen, and Stimson’s datawere
not based on Mayhew, but generated using similar procedures.7
Comparison with a coding of Mayhew’s later published data sug-
gests a high level of reliability. Nevertheless, there are a few dis-
agreements, and, in these cases, the measure used in this article
follows Mayhew. Note, however, that this adjustment is so mar-
ginal it has no notable eﬀect on the results. Mayhew’s coding is
preferred for consistency—it now serves as basis for the whole
dataset. The relevant disagreements are the following: Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson do not count the Omnibus Energy Act of
1991, which here is scored as liberal. In 1996 they count as conser-
vative a bill regarding same sex marriages that is not counted by
Mayhew, and therefore is disregarded here. In the same year, they
leave out an overhaul of pesticides regulation that is counted by
Mayhew, and in this article it is coded as liberal.
Table 2 reports the coded enactments from 1997 to 2004.8 A
dominant feature of this period was the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Eight enactments could be identiﬁed as triggered
by these events. Assessing their ideological content and deciding
whether to count these enactments is often hard. After consider-
ation of each, in light of the generally applied criteria, only three
remain in the table: the 2001 Patriot Act, the airline security bill of
the same year, and the 2002 terrorism insurance bill. The ﬁrst and
the last of these enactments have been counted as liberal. This
coding may seem to place the threshold too low, but excluding
these enactments would seem too restrictive compared to Erik-
son, MacKuen, and Stimson.9 Another hard case in this period is
the 2003 reform of Medicare, which was criticized both for being
Table 1
Important Enactments, 1947–1952, Scored for Ideological Content and Importance
YEAR LEGISLATION
1947 C Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. Major anti-union rollback of Wagner Act. Enacted over Truman’s veto.
1947 C Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.Warded off back-wages claims against employers for travel time, etc.
1948 C Income tax cut. GOP-inspired. Over Truman’s veto.
1949 L Housing Act of 1949. Basic post-New Deal charter for urban redevelopment, public housing.
1949 L Minimum wage increase. To 75 cents.
1950 L Social Security expansion. Benefits up 70%; 10 million new beneficiaries.
1950 C McCarran Internal SecurityAct of 1950.Communist and front groups to register.Emergencydetentionpowers.Deport or exclude subversive
aliens. Over Truman’s veto.
1950 L Tax increase. To finance the KoreanWar.
1950 L Excess Profits Tax of 1950. More war revenue.
1951 L Tax increase. For wartime defense build-up.
1952 L Social Security increase. Benefits up modestly.
1952 C McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. National origins quotas reaffirmed. Provisions to exclude subversives. Enacted
over Truman’s veto.
Note: L represents a liberal change in policy, and C a conservative one. Exceptionally important enactments ~according to Mayhew! are in bold.
Source: Mayhew ~2005!.
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too expensive and for assigning the private sector too large a role.
This reform could have been excluded as an ideological trade-oﬀ,
but it has been kept on the list as a mainly welfare-expanding
( liberal ) measure.
Table 3 reports the coded enactments from 2005 to 2008. In
this period, another four enactments can be seen as triggered by
September 11. Two of these have been kept as conservative mea-
sures: the 2006Military Commissions Act and the 2008 Domestic
SurveillanceAct. In 2008, the ﬁnancial crisis triggered threemajor
enactments: the $168 billion stimulus package, the housing relief
program, and the $700 billion ﬁnancial sector bailout. Although
these enactments were in part criticized for being too supportive
of business, they all have been counted as liberalmeasures, involv-
ing greater governmental intervention in the economy.
Based on the enactments listed in tables 1, 2, and 3, and the
slightly revised version of Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s list
for the years in between, a measure of current policy liberalism
has been created. Liberal enactments have been coded as 1 and
conservative enactments as1. In addition, enactments listed as
exceptionally important by Mayhew have been given double
weight. Then, for each year, all bills enacted into law by the end of
the year have been cumulated to produce ameasure of cumulative
policy liberalism. However, as Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
note,most enactments are liberal, and political battles can be seen
as mainly revolving around the pace of liberal legislation. This
observation can be taken into account by using the overall trend
as a base from which to view the status quo. To achieve this, the
cumulative measure has been regressed on time. The set of resid-
uals obtained from this regressionmeasure cumulative policy lib-
eralism with the linear trend removed and is referred to as Policy.
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 348) lag policy by two
years when they predictmood, while they use the currentmood to
predict election outcomes. As their analyses thus imply a two-
year lag for the eﬀect of policy on elections, a two-year lag is used
here as well.
ANALYSIS
As mentioned, the main hypothesis presented is that when cur-
rent policy ismore liberal, theDemocratic candidate receives fewer
votes, and vice versa. The number of variables in the analysis is
kept to a minimum due to the limited number of observations.
Along with policy, only a variable representing the incumbency
advantage is included.This variable, which has proven relevant in
prior studies (e.g., Stimson 1999b, 97–120), is included because of
its theoretical importance, which will be discussed in the text that
follows. Thus, the main equation to be estimated is this:
Democratic Votet  ab * Policytlg * Incumbencyt «t , (6)
where b is expected to be negative, g is expected to be positive,
and variation in the public’s non-relative policy preference is cap-
tured by the error term.
Leaving policy aside, the operationalization of the variables
is straightforward. The dependent variable is the Democratic
presidential candidate’s share of the combined Democratic and
Table 2
Important Enactments, 1997–2004, Scored for Ideological Content and Importance
YEAR LEGISLATION
1997 L Deal to balance the budget by 2002. $263 billion in spending cuts; $95 billion in tax cuts; $33 billion for new children’s health insurance;
new $500 child tax credit.
1997 L Adoption of foster children. To ease the process.
1998 L Transportation construction. $218 billion for highways and mass transit.
1998 C Overhaul of Internal Revenue Service. More rights and protections to taxpayers.
1998 L 100,000 new school teachers. A Clinton plan.
1999 C Y2K planning. To limit firms’ liability for new-millennium computer mix-ups.
2000 L Community Renewal and New Markets Act. $25 billion over 10 years for development in poor locales.
2001 C Bush tax cut. $1.35 trillion over 10 years; rate cuts; phase-out of estate tax; ease marriage penalty; expansion of child tax credit.
2001 C USA Patriot Act. Broad new authority to president to track, arrest, and prosecute domestic terrorists.
2001 L Airline security. New government program to hire 30,000 airport screeners.
2001 L Education reform. To require annual student testing; $263 billion in new funds.
2002 L Campaign finance reform. To ban soft money and certain pre-election ads.
2002 L Corporate Responsibility Act. To regulate the accounting industry and crack down on corporate fraud. After the collapse of Enron.
2002 L Election reform. New nationwide standards; $3.9 billion to help the states meet them.
2002 L Terrorism insurance. $100 billion back-up against future attacks; to aid insurance and real-estate industries.
2003 L Medicare reform. New prescription drug benefit; large new role for private health plans. To cost a projected $400 billion over a decade.
2003 C $350 billion tax cut. Bush administration plan. Cuts for families, investors, businesses.
2003 C Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.
2004 C Unborn Victims of Violence Act. “Laci and Connor’s law.”Makes it a crime to harm a fetus during commission of a violent federal crime.
Note: L represents a liberal change in policy, and C a conservative one. Exceptionally important enactments ~according to Mayhew! are in bold.
Sources: Mayhew ~2005, 2008!.
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Republican votes. The data are from the US Census Bureau (2008)
and Federal Election Commission (2009). Although imperfect,
the two-party vote share is a convenient expression of the sup-
port for one major party relative to the other, leaving out third-
party candidates. The incumbency advantage is represented by a
variable referred to as Incumbency. It has been scored 1 when a
Democratic president is seeking re-election, 0 when a Republi-
can is, and .5 otherwise.10 As a ﬁnal step, the policy variable has
been recoded so that it takes on a maximum of 1 and minimum
of 0, making the magnitude of its eﬀect more readily interpret-
able and comparable.
The results of the analyses are reported in table 4. Model 1
includes only policy and shows a sizeable coeﬃcient for this vari-
able. The coeﬃcient has the expected sign and it is signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Measured by the adjusted R2, it explains 13% of the
variance. Model 2 contains only the incumbency variable. This
variable also has a sizeable and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient with the
expected sign, explaining a fourth of the variance.Model 3 includes
both variables, which increases the explained variance to 41%.The
two estimates are hardly changed, while their standard errors are
reduced, underlining that this is a better-speciﬁed model.11
The identiﬁed feedback from policy to election outcomes is
not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also of a considerable mag-
nitude. When policy is at its most liberal, as opposed to most
conservative, support for the Democratic candidate in terms of
the two-party vote is lower bymore than eight percentage points.12
The corresponding standardized regression coeﬃcient is 0.44.
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of policy, plotting it over time together
with residual vote shares, taken frommodel 2, which only includes
the incumbency advantage. As the eﬀect of policy is negative, the
residuals have been reversed to ease interpretation.Thus, the resid-
uals refer to Republican votes, while liberalism still scores high
with regard to policy. The policy measure used here is the same as
noted earlier, except it is not lagged. Thus, not surprisingly, the
plot appears to show a lagged eﬀect of policy, in accordance with
earlier studies.
Table 3
Important Enactments, 2005–2008, Scored for Ideological Content and Importance
YEAR LEGISLATION
2005 C Bankruptcy reform. Makes it harder for consumers to shed their debts.
2005 C Class Action Fairness Act. Shifts class-action suits to federal courts, making it harder to bring them against businesses.
2005 L $286 billion transportation measure. Funds for highways, mass transit, a record 6,371 pet member projects.
2006 L Pension reform. To shore up often-shaky private retirement programs for 44 million workers and retirees.
2006 C Military Commissions Act. Sets rules for the government to prosecute terrorism suspects in military tribunals.
2007 L Minimumwage hike.Raised to $7.25 per hour in three stages over two years.Combinedwith $4.84 billion in tax breaks for small businesses.
2007 L Ethics and lobbying reform. New restrictions on gifts, meals, and travel supplied by lobbyists, and on the “revolving door” into the private
sector.
2007 L Overhaul of college student aid programs. Subsidies to private lenders cut; grants to needy students increased.
2007 L Energy conservation. Includes boost in fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles, biofuels subsidies, phase-out of incandescent light
bulbs.
2008 L $168 billion economic stimulus package. Includes rebates to taxpayers, tax incentives for business investment.
2008 L Housing relief program. Includes $300 billion authorization to insure home mortgages; rescue and tightened regulation of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
2008 L $700 bailout of the financial sector. Combined with $150 billion dollar in tax breaks.
2008 C Domestic Surveillance Act. Major expansion of federal anti-terrorism surveillance powers asked by Bush; telecoms immunized against
liability for previous wiretapping.
2008 L New G.I. bill for veterans. $62.8 billion over 11 years to guarantee a four-year college education.
2008 L Guarantee of mental illness insurance. Insurance companies required to cover mental and physical illnesses equally.
Note: L represents a liberal change in policy, and C a conservative one. Exceptionally important enactments ~according to Mayhew! are in bold.
Sources: Mayhew ~2009a, 2009b!.
Table 4
Models of Democratic Two-Party Vote
Shares in American Presidential Elections,
1952–2008
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Policy −8.411** −8.349**
~4.744! ~3.926!
Incumbency 8.743** 8.702**
~3.713! ~3.293!
Constant 53.129*** 44.914*** 49.326***
~2.876! ~2.089! ~2.782!
N 15 15 15
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.25 0.41
Chi2 0.199 0.270 0.017
Note: ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10, in one-tailed tests. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses.Chi2-entries refer toBreusch-Godfrey ~LM! tests for first-order auto-
correlation.
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DISCUSSION
The analysis supports the notion that thermostatic voting takes
place in American presidential elections. When policy is more
liberal, the Democratic candidate receives fewer votes, and vice
versa. On closer inspection, however, the results not only support
the hypothesis derived from the literature, but also do so in a way
that seems compatible with the model of electoral accountability.
The empirical model has two features that may reduce the possi-
ble incentive for presidents to withhold policy changes.
The ﬁrst feature is the lag with which the public responds to
policy change. Although it is hard to ascertain its exact form, it is
clear that policy changes tend to have a weaker eﬀect on the ﬁrst
election following them than they do on later elections. This lag
may thus shield ﬁrst-term presidents from some of the feedback
they would otherwise have faced in their second election.
The second feature is the incumbency advantage. Given the
amount of policy change during an average presidency and the
size of the incumbency advantage, the latter should generally over-
shadow the negative feedback of policy for presidents seeking
re-election. This is important, as these presidents are exactly the
ones who might otherwise have had the most reason to be con-
cerned. Moreover, in the analysis presented in this article, as in
earlier studies, the eﬀects of incumbency and policy have been
modeled as independent of each other, although it is possible that
policy change contributes to the incumbency advantage, or at least
is required to retain it.13 Incumbent presidents may partly gain
their advantage by delivering popular policies. Several of themech-
anisms proposed to explain the incumbency advantage, such as
“credit claiming,”14 might allow for such a link to policy change.
This possible link could remove any short-term incentive to con-
strain the fulﬁllment of public demands.
Together, the lag and the incumbency advantage suggest ther-
mostatic voting is more strongly felt in the long run and in elec-
tions in which the incumbent president is not running. The latter
is almost exclusively the case when a president has reached the
term limit, and thus has had a signiﬁcant chance to inﬂuence
policy. Accordingly, presidents’ successor candidates tend to be
greatly disadvantaged. The only apparent exception to this rule
would be if these candidates could share in the incumbency
advantage—a possibility illustrated by the widely held belief that
Al Gore could have won the 2000 election had he been willing to
run on his predecessor’s record. This also illustrates there is more
to learn about the incumbency advantage, as well as thermostatic
voting, and the data provided in this article should facilitate fur-
ther research. 
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1. See, for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), Campbell et al.
(1960), or Converse (1964, 1970).
2. This conclusion could be challenged based on the fact that the items available
for analysis have been selected by pollsters (see Best 1999), but in this article,
as in the extant literature, this one-dimensional model is used.
3. It also implies that policy and the public’s preference are measured on compa-
rable scales, as no coeﬃcients are included. Neither is a constant included in
this deﬁnition, which means that mood is 0 when policy equals the public’s
preference. Asking people in surveys “how much” government they would like
is generally not a viable option, however, so we cannot normally know this
preference and this issue is therefore mostly of theoretical relevance.
4. Other studies have focused on house elections (e.g., De Boef and Stimson
1995).
5. For simplicity, these illustrations use the case of a Democratic incumbent, but
note that equivalent illustrations could be made referring to a Republican
one.
6. After 1990, their data are not based on Mayhew’s work (see later paragraph).
7. The initial list of important enactments was made by Jay Greene (Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 329–330).
8. Contemporary articles and comments in The New York Times have been used
as sources on how the enactments were perceived.
9. Setting the threshold higher would not noticeably aﬀect the reported results.
10. However, two special cases arise because the candidates were vice presidents
who assumed presidency before the election: Lyndon B. Johnson, after the
assassination of John F. Kennedy, and Gerald Ford, after the resignation of
Richard Nixon, following theWatergate scandal. As this scandal probably
caused as much damage as holding oﬃce gave an advantage, the latter case
has been coded as 0.5 (whereas the other case has been coded as 1).
11. This model also performs well in terms of diagnostic tests. Tests for auto-
regressive autocorrelation (Breusch-Godfrey), autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (Engle’s ARCH), and heteroskedasticity conditional on ﬁtted
values (Breusch-Pagan) do not indicate that the residuals of this model are
nonspherical. Moreover, the Dickey-Fuller test indicates that the residuals are
signiﬁcantly stationary.
12. This result does not appear dependent on speciﬁc modeling choices. Nor is it
driven by any particular election, judging by jackknifed regressions, and stan-
dard errors based on these.
13. This idea can only be tested if properly speciﬁed, which ﬁrst would require the
development of a more elaborate theory. Therefore, and also because of the
few available degrees of freedom, this idea has not been incorporated in the
analysis presented. It is, however, an interesting topic for further research.
14. Although Mayhew (1974) introduced this term with regard to congressional
incumbency advantages, the term appears just as relevant with regard to pres-
idents, asWeisberg (2002) notes.
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